Analyzing the Russian's Interventionist Policy in the Syrian Crisis

Hussein Dehshyar

Prof. of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran
h-daheshiar@yahoo.com

Mahdieh Heydari∗

Ph.D. International Relations, Allameh Tabatabai University
(Corresponding Author)m.heydari2010@yahoo.com

Abstract

Purpose: The main purpose of this article is to understand the interventionist policy of Russia in the Syrian crisis

Method: is an explanatory – description method and from the perspective of the Stanford School. So, the main question is "why did Russia use interventionist policy and violent behavior in the Syrian crisis?" The temporary hypothesis is that Russia, based on its threat perception to its important values, used the interventionist policy in the Syrian crisis. So, Russia's core values, based on the Stanford School, including: supporting of its strategic allay such as Iran, fighting with terrorist and take away from its back – yard and rising its bargaining power in the international system, these values deal with the actor's position and quality of life in the international system. Therefore, they fall into the category of important or secondary values than vital values.

Result: by applying the Stanford School Model, this result has been concluded that there was a positive correlation between the Russian's perception threat (stimulus) and its interventionist and violent behavior (response) in the Syrian crisis.

Findings: At least, findings of this article declared that Russian decision maker, by proper perception concerns and fears of environmental threats, could make balance of power in front of USA and its allies in negotiations table and in ground operations, freezed successfully the Islamic extremist in Syria and supported Iranian forces and their plans just due to its benefit and its interest both during the war and during the post war. In this article, the Russian threat perception is an independent variable of research, and use of interventionist behavior is the dependent variable of this research. Data collection and information methods are also based on library and Internet methods.

Key words: Threat Perception, Russia, Syria, Stanford School, Response - Stimulus, Crisis Management.

1. Introduction

There are various techniques for crisis management that have been used by the nations during the wars and crises These techniques are ranges from negotiation, mediation, judicial review (peaceful techniques) to civilian pressure, nonviolent military action, and ultimately indirect and direct violence. Violent or interventionist behavior than negotiation, mediation, or other peaceful crisis management techniques, poses a great threat to values and more distrust among adversaries. More violence is more fragile than minimum encounters; when adversaries resort to war, the legacy of a crisis will be greater.

In the Russian approach's international crisis management, use of military power, ideology, economics, and military technology has often played an influential role, and in the new era (after post the Cold War era), military power and energy diplomacy have had main role in its international crisis management. Also to restore Russia's historical power and expand its influence in the former Soviet Union, especially in the surrounding areas, reviving Russia's power is one of the main goals in its management crisis. Russia's strategic culture is based on the use of military power and a centralized decision-making structure in every crisis, and now it has a multilateralism approach in order to restore and revive the historical Russian power.

Russia, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, has been supporting the legitimate government of Bashar al-Assad and the political and peaceful management of the crisis. But by advancing ISIS and the possible victory of the Western Arab Axis in 2014, Russian interventionist behavior and the violent crisis management began in September 2015, with doing airstrikes in Syria. Now the main question of this research is, why Russia has used violent action to manage the Syrian crisis? The temporary response is that Russia has used the violence behavior to manage the Syrian crisis, when its key leaders found the threat perception on their core values in the Syrian crisis. S0, by applying the Stanford School framework the results declared that Russian decision maker's concerns and fears of environmental threats and proper these threat perception (stimulus) could make balance of power in negotiations table and in ground operations and freezed the Islamic extremist in Syria and supported Iranian forces and their plans due to its benefit and its interest both during the war and during the post war (response).

2. Research background

In the field of crisis and instability research there'r not significant works in Persia, and there is only a few limited works that it has been translated into Persian. Including Michael Bercher's book, Crisis in World Politics: The Rise and Fall of Crisis in Two Volumes, translated by Mir Fardin Qureshi. In this book, Brechr uses a pluralistic study of quantitative and qualitative analyzes and a case study of crises to identify crises. Another book by Michael Brecher in collaboration with Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Patrick James, and Hamad bin Judea,

Mark A. Boyer, Steven (1988). As the crisis of conflict and instability is translated by Ali Sobhdel. In this book, Brecher and his colleagues address the crises of foreign and international politics in the world, which are very technical, complex, and contain mathematical and statistical findings. But there are numerous articles in Persian and English language about the goals motives, and behavior that have addressed Russia's involvement in the Syrian crisis. Including Shay Herzoi's article titled "Return of the Polar Bear to the Middle East" in 2016. In this article shows author cause Russia intervention in Syria. So, shift in Russia policy to become a great international power as well as before collapsed USRR, especially since Putin's return in May 2012, when Russia's new policy toward national interests and national security was developed, even at the cost of confronting the West. In this article, the author concludes that the expansion of Russian-Israeli relations is a kind of balance of power between Iran and Israel in the region, which is pursued by both countries. One of the most strengths points of this article is the reasons for the Russian-Israeli relations in Syria, and one of its weaknesses point is the lack of attention to how to balance power between Iran and Israel in Syria. Anthony Cordesman's article is "Russia's Policy in Syria, Hybrid War" (2015). He analyzes Russia's goals in Syria. And he concludes that for Moscow, the only way to stabilize the region is to preserve Assad, and that maintaining Assad could serve Russia's other goals. One of the most important Russia's goals is to expand its regional and international power and influence. In this article, the author does not address the challenges facing Russia during the Syrian crisis.

In Davood Kiani's article entitled: "Russia's policy in the Middle East: Axes and Stimuli", 2008, He cited the reasons for Russia's activism in the Middle East and said that many security, political and economic stimuli have caused Moscow to engage in developments and crises in the region. In conclusion, the author argues that Russia's sense of historical insecurity and territorial vulnerabilities have led Russia to pursue foreign policy not on the basis of competition with the United States or economic interests, but on the basis of concern and fear of environmental threats. Set yourself up. One of the strengths of this article is the multilevel analysis of the reasons for Russia's presence in Syria, and its weaknesses are the lack of payment in the way of achieving these goals.

In Hossein Dehshiar's article that entitled "The Syrian Crisis, the US Strategic Ambiguity and the Opportunity of the Russians", 2015, this author first deals with the internal situation in Syria and the causes of the crisis in this country then he cites the US strategic ambiguity or uncertainty of a single strategy in Syria as a factor in the Russians' opportunism in Syria, and he sees it as one of the most influential factors influencing the future of regional equations and the position of regional actors. So he concluded it is possible that the crisis could spread to other countries in the Middle East. Given that the author concludes the position of regional actors depends on Russia's strategies, he does not mention the type and form of Russia's relationship with actors in the Middle East, especially major powers such as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and the

weaknesses of this article may be lake of analyzes how other actor can make a balance of power in front of Russia I think. Also, the another Persian article that writ by Mehdi Hedayati Shahidani and Romanovich Vladimir Romanov Pinkoftsev was entitled "Russian and American Behavioral Patterns in Regional Crisis Management, A Case Study of the Syrian Crisis", 2015. In this article, the authors use the George Modelsky Crisis Control Model, The remnants of the Cold War are considered to be the most important means of resolving international conflicts by these two great powers. SO, this article is explained only by the great world powers, especially Russia and the United States, and forgotten the major regional powers that played a key role in the Syrian crisis, it is a small weakness of this article.

3. The Stanford School Analysis Framework

Analyzing and studying the behavior of governments in situations of conflict and crisis and the alignment between violent provocation and violent response are the basis of the Stanford school. The stimulus-response model, along with the perception variable, are the key variables in explaining this question why threat governments behave violently in international crises (North, 1975: 15). The perception of threat in this School stems from the perception of role that governments who involved in the crisis define for themselves. This perception of role extracted from the power sources of governments (zinnes, 1966: 150). The school's pattern of hostile response or reciprocal action emphasizes that hostility or tension expressed by government "A" to government "B" and confrontation similar to government "B", at a higher level of conflict leads to spiral of growing hostility and escalating tensions that it leads to another war. So, due to interpretation of the Stanford school "conflict-conflict" model that it bring a new war so, told government' s behavior is like human behavior when he faced with a threat, he has an appropriate response to environmental stimuli. Conflict performed against all parties must be exactly the same as the conflict received (wilkenfeld, 1991: 137).


Figure 1 : The Interaction Model

Source: (Holsti, Brody, North, 1975)

It is obviously hostile physical actions in a crisis more stressful than hostile verbal actions (Holsti, Brody, North, 1975: 254).The crises often started with violence more likely attracted by the attention of the great powers than non-violent crises, because violent crises have a stronger potential for making changes. It has fundamental and long-term implications for both its participants and for international systems (Wilkenfeld, 1991: 148).

Figure 2: Tigger- Behavior Interaction

Source: (Wilkenfeld, 1991)

The operationalizing of violent behavior that associated with crisis management in Stanford School is the intensity of violence that used by governments to manage crisis, so this intensity of violence plays an important role in crisis management (North, Koch, JR, Zinnes, 1960: 340). The intensity of violence due to Stanford school has threefold: full-blown war, serious conflict, and low or no violence. Lack of violence or low-level violence includes minor incidents that result in limited casualties, and serious conflicts include the real threat of violence and direct military intervention in crises (Brody, North, 1964: 125). Full-scale warfare is often a threat to the superpowers that they use of their nuclear weapons. The severity of the violence used due to importance that decision makers for certain interests, that they have in a crisis and perceive it as a serious threat (Holsti, Brody, North, 1975: 171).

Threat of values is a threat felt by decision makers or actors involved in the crisis (Boulding, 1959: 118). It is classified as follows: (Strong) threat: including the threat to the country's existence, threat of serious damage to infrastructure , threat of infiltration (superpowers), threat of territorial integrity and threat of the political system, threat of extensive damage (global bombing, occupation), threat of low or weak, including: threat of infiltration (for non-superpowers) or influence of the international system (diplomatic isolation, discontinuation of support for friends), threats to economic interests and threats to population and property (Shechelling, 1966: 116). Actor's threat perception of each other depend on many factors such as their capacity, their relative power capabilities, accumulation of power, weapons and their military skills, geographical location, population of the country and another forms of power and even its distribution of power method, that will be directly effect on the hierarchy and power configuration and changing or balancing power in crises,

as well as the emergence of cooperative or hostile behavior in international crises (North, 1975: 12).

4. Russia's Important Values in the Syrian Crisis

4-1. Supporting Iran, Russia's allay in Syrian crisis

For many reasons Russia needs to cooperation with Iran. One of the Russia's main concerns, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, has been the growing political, economic and military influence of the United States in the former republics of the country and the Eastern European region as well as the existing unipolar system, in which United States considers itself the sole superpower. From this point of view, Russia considers Iran as its partner, because Tehran, like Moscow, opposes NATO's expansion to the east, the expansion of the US economic and political influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Western domination, especially the United States is focused on the energy interests of countries in this area and the exclusion of Iran and Russia from the region's routes of energy transfer to the outside world. In addition, Russia needs Iran's cooperation to resolve political disputes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which are essential to maintaining security in this region. Examples of these differences are the Chechen crisis, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the last civil war in Tajikistan (Tarmi, 2002: 57).

In the Syrian crisis the Russians are worried about the collapse of their friendly regimes especially Iran, for making balance of power in front of the West's presence in the region. So, since Vladimir Putin became president, he has sought to rebuild Russia's relations with its allies in the Middle East, from the Cold War era, that it including Iran and Syria, Libya, and Iraq in which they were central actors that could balance the US presence in the region. Iran, among of them was a strong opponent of the United States and a close and strategic ally of Syria and was also main part of this axis. Russian leaders thought that the 2003 Iraq war was largely the result of an attempt to weaken the anti-American coalition in the region, and saw strong support for the war from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Russia has calculated that the fall of Assad could isolated Iran and would made it vulnerable to attacks by Israel or the United States So, it supported Iran during the Syrian crisis. (Gorenburg, 2012: 3).

In fact, due to minds and Russians perceptions, Syria is a key tool against Western influence in Southwest Asia. On the other hand, Syria is Russia's only dependent state in the Middle East, and Russia is eager to show that it remains an important force in the world and in the region (Gorenburg, 2012: 3). One of the consequences of the Syrian crisis on Russia's regional interests is the impact of the fall of Assad's likelihood on the regional balance is weakening friendly regimes such as Iran against the US-Israeli-Saudi coalition against Russia (Simbar, Sotoudeh, Esmaili, 2016: 309). Therefore, strengthening the axis of Russia's friends in the Syrian crisis is one of Russia's goals. Cooperation between Iran and Russia is considered as a response to US-Turkish military

cooperation and a kind of reconstruction of the stereotypes of the Cold War era (Kolaei, 2006: 11).

Iran and Russia cooperation could lead to security challenges for both actors and greatly increase their security costs. Thus, the Syrian crisis has provided an opportunity for two countries to look at each other as strategic allies not as rivals. New regional and global rankings, especially after the downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey and all Arab and US allies shows the severance of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and its allies with Iran. Since Trump took office in the US Syrian stage has more complicate and shift the political landscape of chess in the geopolitical conflict, so, this situation has brought Iran and Russia again closer together. Russia's opposition to US military action against Iran on Syria has led to widespread unrest that leading to instability (Barzegar, 2015: 14).

Currently, two countries 'main concern is to prevent the spread of terrorism and extremism, which in turn has exacerbated sectarian tensions, could destabilize the two countries' borders or even the interior. In fact, it has been a national security concern that has focused Iran and Russia on a defensive view - increasing the regional role in addressing the threats posed by the enemy and its opposing forces. The West and its regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have always sought to minimize the role of the governments in Syria and Iraq and their allies (Iran and Russia), but this policy has now backfired. And it has led to the formation of a new coalition of all these countries to counter Takfiri terrorists, whose defeat is tantamount to the disintegration of Syria and Iraq (Barzegar in Iran Project, 2015: 14).

There is no doubt that the alliance between Iran and Russia is very important for Moscow, and Russia has relied on the fact that Iran does not intend to jeopardize this cooperation. In August 2016, Tehran allowed Moscow to use the Hamadan base. As it is seen in the following map.

Map: 1. Iran and Russia military cooperation in Hamadan air base

https://www.dhakatribune.com/

Since the end of World War II, Tehran has never allowed a foreign country to use its base in Iran (Borshcherskaya, 2018: 9). Tehran has also said it will allow Moscow to use its air bases in the future. Therefore, In September 2017, Moscow due to support of Iran in U.N., threatened to veto a UN resolution against Iran in a Security Council resolution. This cooperation has implicit

implications for US policy in the Middle East. The perception of many Russian security elites is that the overthrow of Assad is, in fact, a major part of Iran's strategy to destabilize. Russia's perception of the threat of Iran's isolation from the United States, and especially from its strategic ally, Israel, and its jeopardizing its fundamental values and interests by extending terrorism to its national borders, has forced Russia to support The Islamic Republic of Iran's actions in the Syrian crisis should be addressed and its isolation by the West and regional governments should be prevented. But Russia make a balance between Iran and Israel in the region (Klein: 2012: 8).

Although Russia gives importance to its cooperation with Iran, but it only uses it to secure its vital and strategic interests, and their main purposes are cooperation with the West and the United States and the avoidance of tensions with the United States. The well-known practice of this state in this direction has always been based on the formula of "appropriate command and appropriate strategy".

As said above, it may be relevant to quickly go through the potential points of disagreement between the two allies. In the short term, one can observe some degree of competition between the Iranian and the Russians in trying to get access to Syria's rare economic resources; contracts on phosphates, other natural resources, and the exploitation of the Latakia harbor are fiercely disputed between Russian and Iranian businesspeople. On a more sensitive issue, it is also likely that Russia and Iran are engaged in a rivalry to put people close to them in key positions in the Syrian military and security forces, so as to secure a degree of influence in decision-making process of the Assad regime. In this respect, it is often reported that Russia advocates a central role for a renovated Syrian National Army, while Iran is keen to maintain an important part for IRGC-affiliated Shia militias in the regime's security apparatus (Duclos, 2019: 2).

In the medium term, Russia and Iran- not forgetting Hezbollah, and in conjunction with a Syrian regime that is not an easy partner – still have to crushing of the jihadi force in the Idlib province, the recovering of the Kurdish-controlled northeastern part of the country, and, eventually, the recon quest of the Turkish- controlled areas. Recent events suggest that the two allies don't agree on how to deal with those challenges. Finally, in the long run, there are reasons to think that Russia and Iran do not share the same vision of Syria's future. Russia a secular Syria that is somewhat decentralized, and not necessarily territorially intact, while Iran sees something closer to the Lebanese model. There is no doubt that. Russia and Iran have different ideas about the regional balance of which Syria should be a part; this goes back to the Israeli relationship whit Russia (Duclos, 2019: 2).

4-2. Threat of Expansion of Islamic Extremists in Russia's Back-Yard

The presence of a large number of extremist Chechen forces in the Syrian crisis and the war against the Syrian regime is the best option for Russia to counter these extremist forces outside its borders (in Syria). This confrontation will cost

much less than bringing the confrontation into Russia (Hedayati Shahidani, Pinkossff, 2014: 64). One of the main reasons for Russia's support for Syria is Moscow's concern that a Salafist-Wahhabi government will come to power in Syria, because then Russia will not only lose the interests in Syria, but also ISIS is a threat to the security and stability of the Muslim regions of Russia (Koushki, Taheri Bezi, 2015: 57). Raising extremist Islamists in the Middle East could lead to the strengthening of centrifugal currents in Russia. So, Russia interprets the developments in Syria as emergence of extremist religious currents. Geographical and cultural proximity between the Central Asian republics and the Caucasus with the Middle East has made it more sensitive for Russia to maintain security and stability in the region (Kolaei, Sultannejad, 2016: 37). The threat of escalating political instability and, consequently, Raising of extremist Islamism are the factors that lead to increase Russia's concern over the escalation of the crisis in Syria. The main reason for this concern is that more than 20 million Muslims live in the southern part of the country, especially in the North Caucasus. Raising in the birth rate of Muslims in Russia, along with the decline in the Russian Orthodox Islamic population, has heightened this concern (Trenin, 2013: 15). Thus, Russian leaders, with wide-spreading political and military support to the Syrian government, have been trying to prevent extremist and Salafist Islamists from coming to power (Kiani, Khan-Mohammadi, 2013: 111). For Russia, this is an opportunity to weaken these extremist groups on Syrian soil and divert them from Russia's borders, so it can engage with them in the vicinity of its territory (Ahmed Sadek, 2015: 36). By provoking and promoting extremism, the Syrian crisis could encourage Muslims living in Russia to take various anti-government actions, thereby threatening the country's national security, on the other hand, the existence of pro-independence tendencies in the regions of the republics of the Russian Federation can emerge as a significant threat to Russia (Demir, 2016: 66).

Russia's success in the Syrian crisis could lead to the control and sometimes restriction of terrorist and takfiri acts. In addition to Russia's long-standing interests abroad, this could reduce its national security risks, as Moscow has always feared the spread of religious fundamentalism and the spread of political Islam on its borders (Garrilis, 2016: 7). So, understanding the dangers and consequences of these instabilities has forced the Kremlin to intervene directly and, in this way, pay for its military intervention (Peyrouse, Boonstra, Larulle, 2012: 7).

4-3. Increasing Bargaining Power in front of the United States and the West

One of the main directions of Russia's foreign policy during Medvedev's presidency, and of course in Putin's view, was to put aside the sense of inferiority of the 1990s and return Russia to a high position in international affairs. This policy has given a new dimension to Russia's presence in the Middle East. Although Syria does not have much wealth and influence, but it

has played a more important role in adopting and accompanying this policy than other Arab countries (Kiani, Khan Mohammadi, 2013: 122). Since the crisis in Syria began in March 2011, the United States, the European Union and the Arab League have sought to put pressure on Bashar al-Assad through the Security Council, but due to opposition from Russia and China, this plan has failed. The Security Council vetoed the two countries in condemning the violence in Homs. However, this drew strong criticism from Western and Arab countries, and even Qatar and Saudi Arabia accused Moscow of allowing the Assad government to kill people. But Russia began the first phase of its support for the Syrian government within the framework of political support. By escalating the second phase of Moscow's support, in the form of arms and security helps, began to affect the crisis process, and continued until the third phase, which was a direct military entry into the crisis (Wakim, 2015: 28). From the spring of 2015 to September of this year, Moscow began to prepare the ground for a direct entry into the crisis, in other words, to start a war. The end of this process was Vladimir Putin's remarks at the United Nations in September 2015, which officially declared Russia's entry into the war to be completely legal and in accordance with international standards, at the request of the Syrian government and in the context of the fight against terrorism. With the start of military intervention in Syria in 2015.

So the Middle East became a key testing ground for Russia's return to the world stage, and reviving Russia's lost glory and playing a role as a "great power" in a nearby region. Putin's main goal was to enter the Russian military scene. It is quite clear that Russia has made the Syrian crisis a tool for balancing power with the West and the United States, not a small goal (Haddad, 2015: 78).

Russia intends to ensure that Russia's role and its position in a multilateral system is maintained as an effective, and influential superpower against the United States and Europe. And the United States and the European Union should accept Russia's role in decision-making throughout Europe and the United States (Wakim, 2015: 29). Moscow has tried to invade Syria. As a last resort, it has maintained its influence in the Middle East and the Arab world and prevented it from falling into the hands of the West, so that in the current situation, much of Russia's geopolitical and strategic conflict with the West, especially the United States, is in the Middle East. It goes back to the Syrian crisis and its environmental conditions (Philips, 2012: 6). If the Russian Federation's pivotal role in the Syrian crisis leads to the final defeat of Assad's opponents, it will reaffirm Russia's ability to resolve regional crises and greatly enhance its political prestige (Massoudnia and et.al, 2012: 104). With a long-term strategic vision, Russia has made the Syrian crisis, as a playing field, crucial to testing its political ability to confront the West and its efforts for a "multilateralism" in international system. To this end, Moscow has tried in the first place to portray the Syrian crisis as an internal crisis and to prevent it from becoming international and, consequently, the direct influence of the West in the region (Shaykh al-Islami, Begi, 2013: 157). And secondly, it has used the political and diplomatic capacity of the Russian Federation to pursue any

decision on the Syrian crisis in the form of the United Nations and the Security Council, in the context of Moscow's strategic objections and serious opposition to it (Trenin, 2017: 25). Putin believes that one of his policies in Syria is how to deal with the West, which includes incitement to conflict and its engagement, as well as the underlying implications of his intervention in Syria. Since the West considered Moscow a weak power, it made Putin bolder in intervening in Syria. Russia's intervention in Syria enables Putin to demonstrate the status quo (Borshchevskaya, 2018: 10).

The perception of Russian leaders is that the West and Russia are embroiled in a political conflict. In this way, the West is trying to push Russia back from its sphere of influence and benefit (Bogeskoveviksew and Erikson, 2017: 20). However, Russia's military intervention could be diplomatically an influential force in dealing with the West in order to gain concessions from it. For example, the lifting of sanctions against Russia and the recognition of Crimea in the face of this scenario could increase both Russia's influence and, at the same time, expand its borders. It can also re-establish Russia's right to influence its formerly obedient states as well as it can be used to identify Russia's interests and ultimately help Russia's economic stability by lifting sanctions. Thus, Syria has become a battleground between Russia and the European Union and the United States, which can only end with the recognition of Russia as a great power, or That in the end one of the two sides will be forced to leave the playing field (Bogeskoveviksew, and Erikson, 2017: 36).

Thus, Russia is very eager to use maximum violence to gain the leverage of bargaining power in the Syrian negotiations for its main security goals and to identify it (Cornell, 2016: 140), In other words, it portrays Russia's role as a glorious and great power that capable to resolve crises. Therefore, Russia seeks to find effective capability and influence and shape its desired results in the region. Given this important goal, during Russia's military intervention in the Syrian crisis since September 2015, Russia has acted as a victor and a hero of the war, that could prevented further unrest. Due to, in the negotiations, it made great efforts to convince Bashar al-Assad and other powers present in the Syrian war that the results should be in their favor. failing overthrow Bashar al-Assad, along with Russia's close alliance such as Iran and creating of fire zones, led to marginal role for the United States and given Russia the power to bargain and gain special influence, not only in Syria, but also throughout the Middle East. As Moscow feels, its policies in Russia are very wise and flawless. As its role increased, the United States, and other actors forced to accept it as an inevitable mediator in the conflict, as well as a great power throughout the region (Sladden, Wasser, Connable, Grand and Clement, 2017: 12). Thus, Russia's intervention in the Syrian crisis has been to portray a particular curtain, both internally and internationally. It is clear that Moscow is sending signals to the UN Security Council through its veto power to stop or prevent any foreign military intervention in Moscow. Moscow also opposes all sanctions imposed on Damascus by the Security Council.

5. Russia's Interventionist actions in Syria

According to the Stanford School Framework, the intensity of violence in every crisis is threefold: full-blown war, serious conflict, and low or no violence. Lack of violence or low-level violence includes minor incidents that result in limited casualties, and serious conflicts include the real use of violence and direct military intervention in crises (Brody, North, 1975: 25). So, Russia's interventionist actions in Syria includes in serious violence that it containing military actions, making military bases in Syria, military training forces, and making allies during the Syrian crisis.

Russia has taken military action in the Syrian crisis since September 2015, due to threat perception to its important values . In the early years of the 2011-2014 crises, Russia's dominant behavior was based on minimal violence, but by rising of extremists and the possibility of a victory for the Western Arab Axis, Russia started serious military actions in Syria. Russia has established a meaningful relationship with Assad's family over the past 45 years, and has made Syria a strategic ally of Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has closely monitored Russia's security situation in Syria since the end of the civil war in Syria and provided military equipment and military training to the Syrian military. Russia's the most weapons used by Syrian military forces in the fight against ISIS, and Syria has a large number of officers trained by Russian military institutions. Russia's Duma Council specifically approved and supported Putin's move to send Russian troops to Syria on October 30, 2015. This unity of the Russians on important political and security issues is quite obvious. In September 2015, due to request of the Syrian government, Russian warplanes entered Syria and carried out very intense airstrikes against Assad's enemies. Simultaneously with the support of the Russian Air Force, the Syrian government used offensive ground forces backed by Iran and Hezbollah to retake the areas of Hama, Idlib, Latakia and Aleppo (Shumilin, 2016: 56). Iran, Iraq, Russia and Syria set up intelligence center in Baghdad to coordinate strategic and military cooperation on multiple fronts in Syria and Iraq. These military advances on the battlefield led to the United States and its allies the European Union (EU) have convened an emergency meeting on Russian airstrikes. Federica Mogherini called Russia's intervention as a "game changer" in Syria. At the same time, US President Barack Obama insisted on removing Bashar al-Assad from power, and Russia called him the "swamp" leader of Syria (Mohseni, 2015: 1-2) Russia with precision guided airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria with combat equipment such as warplanes (su-25), Sukhoi 24m (su-24m) and su-34 bombers fired by Sukhoi su-30cm fighters. Although a deadly phase of severity violence in Syria has begun since Russia's direct military intervention, but this actions does not mean that the security situation of the Syrian government, Bashar al-Assad, has not deteriorated.

Even if Russia's military action is less than a political one, it can be said that Russia is making its biggest move in the Middle East. Russia's military intervention quickly eliminated any significant scenario advertised in the major

Arab media to create a "no-fly zone." It is clear that any kind of no-fly zone, In the Libyan model, it has become impossible for the United States and its former allies. Unless the Western-Arab coalition itself shot down Russian warplanes directly (Financial Times, 2015). Some Russian experts have argued that cruise missiles are essential for destroying terrorist airstrikes. A very important point that was highlighted in these attacks, it was the possibility of Russian, American or Israeli warplanes colliding with each other. This indicated that the great powers were fully aware of the aftermath of the war and were very careful to avoid a deadly confrontation and the occurrence of a larger conflict (Barnard, Macfarquhar, 2015: 8).

For the Russians, the Americans in Syria were pursuing several important goals that were in conflict with Russia's goals. From the Russian point of view, the first goal of the Americans was to prevent them from accessing the sea trade routes, and the second goal was to destabilize the order in Central Asia, and the third goal was to damage and destroy the national security of Russia, China and Iran in the region. The growth of US conflict of interest with Russia, Iran, and China has been global since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

5-1. Deployment of Russian Equipment and Combat Forces to Syria

According to a report, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made major changes to Russia's military role in Syria. No one can yet estimate how many troops and military equipment Russia provided to Syria, but Putin's major military action and the Russian military equipment sent include:
A- Developing anchorage facilities in the naval base in Tartus and improving and equipping in the southern air base of Latakia.
B. Send 3-4 Sukhoi 27 fighters, 12 Sukhoi 24 fighters, 12 Sukhoi 10 fighters, 1 PU Shi La TUAVs.
C. Providing an unspecified number of new artillery equipment, mm152 system.
D. Sending 6 or more 90-T war tanks, 35 or more new 13T R-82A / B wheeled armored vehicles - Fighting Carriers (AFVs) with 30 mm moving tower cannons, and an unspecified number of Russian HMVs. .
E- Sending more than 2000 canopies.
F- Sending an unlimited number of air-ground defense systems 5A-22.
G- Sending 200 sailors and prefabricated houses for 1.500 personnel at the airport near the ancestral homes of President Bashar al-Assad.

Transferring this military equipment by Russia has led to the strengthening of the Syrian military and, consequently and maintaining Bashar al-Assad's regime. This huge amount of warfare capabilities enables Russia to intervene actively in the Syrian civil war while Assad is losing control of his power and his potential to confront the United States and other allies who support ISIS and other savage extremists sent from Saudi Arabia to other Persian Gulf states. Also, this volume of modern equipment created a serious and potential obstacle for the United States and other allies or any other savage terrorist to move away from any conflict of interest with Russia in the safe areas created in Syria (Misto, Temizer, 2019).

5-2. Some Russian Military Bases in Syria

The Russian Federation's army since the beginning of war with Takfiri terrorists, has also built military bases in Syria, which are sometimes used jointly with the Syrian army.

5-2-1. Russian Military Base in the Port of Tartus

The Tartus military base is designed to repair and maintain Russian equipment and used by Russian fleets in the Mediterranean region. This Russian military base was established in 1971 to expand the former Soviet fleet. The naval base can accommodate a variety of military vessels from 100 to more than 300 meters (small to medium and large) on the pier, which can be used for "Odalovi" destroyers, "Salo" and "Kairov" vessels and aircraft carriers. The base is equipped with a barracks, warehouse buildings, floating docks and boats for repairs, and about 50 Russian sailors are present. According to some sources, the Tartus military base is fully mortgaged by the Russian Federation until 2042. Moscow has stated its assistance to Syria in the framework of international law and in this provided military and effective assistance to Syria from this base (Misto, Temizer, 2019).

5-2-2. Russian Air Base in Latakia

The Russian air base in Latakia is one of the largest air bases in Syria, and the two Russian fighters are now using it to strike ISIS positions. The Russian fighter jets are stationed at air bases in the coastal province of Latakia in the western of Syria. Dozens of fighter jets and helicopters of two military transport planes are ready to fly at these bases in order to counter the terrorist groups present in Syria. The Russia's pantsir-S1 and Buk-M2E systems have been used to protect the Latakia air base in Syria. The area (Hamimim air base) is heavily guarded, because ISIS is 40 kilometers away from and fighter jets are constantly flying over it to take care of the base. At this base, Russian forces are using drones to detect and collect flights. There were many flights from this airport. Two or three planes are ready to fly in 2 hours. Also, after completing their mission, each fighter will be ready to perform a new mission again. According to the Russian Air Force, M-24 helicopters are responsible for securing the air base. And each carries eight soldiers with full military equipment. Sukhoi-24, Sukhoi-25, Sukhoi-30 and Sukhoi-34 fighters, as well as M-24 helicopters and M-8-Trabar helicopters at the base.

5-2-3. Russian Air Force Base in Al-Shayrat

Recently, media sources suggested that Russia plans to build its second air base after the Hamimim air base in Latakia in Homs province and the suburbs of the city center in order to play important roles in the fight against terrorists and extremists. The Russian Federation efforts to strengthen its military presence in Syria. Al-Shairat Air Base is one of the most important Syrian air bases and is now securing the base and receiving the advanced Sukhoi aircraft (Misto, Temizer, 2019).

6. Conclusion

The Stanford School Crisis Management Model assumes that if a threat is perceived to the basic values by a violent stimulus, national key decision- maker will response to it by severity actions or verbal action. In this model actors due to their power, their defined roles, allies, and threat perception intervene in and manage a crisis. So, there is a positive correlation between threat perception and violent policy in every crisis. Russia's intervention policy in Syrian crisis can be considered as an example. At the beginning of Syrian crisis in 2011, the Russian Federation reaction initially was limited to political support and economic and military assistance, but after advancing Syrian opposition armed groups and Takfiri terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Nusra on important Syrian cities, it has increased its support of the Assad regime and efforts to preserve its important values. There were three important values that threatened in Syrian crisis. These values were as Russia stimulus. So, Russia with its interventionist behaviors responded to that. Russia has realized falling of Assad could make Iran vulnerable to being attacked by Israel and the United States, and emerge another crisis in the region. Weakening and losing of its two longtime allies in the Middle East, Iran and Syria, led to broken regional balance of power. Therefore, Russia has tried to define the Syrian crisis as a security situation and try to control and manage the risks with the cooperation of Iran and China. From Russia's point of view, the cost of Russia's military intervention in the Syrian crisis to counter these extremist forces outside its borders is less than extensions of the confrontation within its territory. In any case, if Russia is hesitant in the Syrian crisis and shortens its stance for any reason, it could be another sign of Moscow's weakness and fear of the West, especially the United States. The current US policy toward Russia is isolating and minimizing Russia's influence in the region. Russia intends to ensure that Russia's role and position in a multilateral system is maintained. So Russia has tried to keep Syria as its last gateway to the Middle East and the Arab world, and to prevent it from falling into the hands of the West. In short, Russia military presence in Syria is likely to continue and intensify in the future. And closer ties with its allies and the Syrian government will also maintain and it will gain significant share of Syria's reconstruction. At least Russia could successfully managed the Syrian crisis with applying interventionist policy and gained great velum of reconstruction of Syria after post crisis and maintain the Al – Assad government and revive the Russia historical power.

References

1. Ahmad Sadek, LubnaSafey Eldin (2015). "Russia's Resurgence in Syria: A New Cold War?" *The America University in Cario School of Global Affairs and Department of Public Policy and Administration,* 20-58.

2. Barnard, Anne, Macfarquhar, John (2015). "Middle East, Vladimir Putin Plunges into a Caldron in Syria: Saving Assad", *NY Times 4* Oct/2015.

3. Barzegar, Keyhan (2015). "Russia's Intention, an Opportunity for Iran". In The Iran   Project Disrupting the Chess Board: Perspectives on the Russian Intervention in Syria. *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School*, October, 2015, 12-67.

4. Bogeskoveviksew, Mikkel, Erikson, Robert (2017). "Russia's Engagement in Syria: What are Russia's Motives?" *Copenhagen*, October, NO.5, 15-30.

5. Borshcherskaya, Anna (2018). "Russia's & Goals Go beyond Damascus". *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol, 5. 100-143.

6. Boulding, Kenneth E (1959). "National Image and International System", *the Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VOL, 3, NO, 4, 115-157.

7. Brody, Richard A, North, Robert C. (1964). **"Violence and Hostility: The Path to World War". *Journal of Peace Research***, VOL, 3, NO, 2, 120-162.

8. Cornell, Svante E., (2016). "The Fallacy of Compartmentalization: The West and Russia from Ukraine to Syria**". *European View,*** VOL, 15, NO, 3.

9. Demir, Sertif (2016). "The Impact of Syria Crisis". *Foreign Policy*, NO, 12. 58-83.

10. Duclos, Michel (2019)." Russia and Iran in Syria- a Random Partnership or an Enduring Alliance?" *Atlantic Council*.

11. Financial Times, (2015). "Russia Scuppers No-Fly Zon Plans, the Gun-Buying Rush and the Prospect of a Mega Tsunami". *https://www.ft.com/.html, 10 October*.

12. Garrilis, George (2016). "Can Russia's Peac Plan for Syria". *Belfer Cent for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School,* 4-37.

13. Gornburg, Dmitry (2012). "Why Russia Supports Repressive Regimes in Syria and The Middle East". *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo*, No, 198, 10-42.

14. Haddad,Bassam (2015). "The Russian Moment via Syria", In the Iran Project Disrupting the Chess Board: Perspectives on the Russian. *Harvard Kennedy School*, October, 2015. 70-122.

15. Hedayati Shahidani, Mehdi, Vladimrovich, Pinkossff' (2015). "Russian and American Behavioral Patterns in Regional Crisis Management; a Study of the Syrian Crisis". *Pajoheshhaye Rahbordi*, 3 (12), 54-86.

16. Holsti, Ole R, Richard A. Brody, North, Robert C. (1975). "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Model: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis International Conflict and Integration". *Stanford University*, 170-243.

17. Kelin, Margarete (2012). "Russia's Policy on Syria: On the Way to Isolations?" *German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)*, Vo.1, No. 3, 1-45.

18. Kiani, Davood, Khan Mohammadi, Zohreh (2013). "Analysis of the Causes of Russia's Presence in the Syrian Crisis". *Faslnameh Rahbord*, Vol 22, No 69, 101-146. (In persian)

19. Kolaei, Elahe, Sultannejad, Mohammad (2016). "Causes and Motives of Russian Military Operations in Syria". *Motaleate Rahbordy*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Serial No. 73, 7-42. (In persian)

20. Kolaei, Elaheh (2006). "Relations between Iran and Russia, Continuity or Change", *Moasase Farhangi Motaleati Orasiay va Ghafghaz*, 1 (1), 10-53.

21. Koushki, Mohammad Sadegh, Taheri Bezi, Ebrahim (2015). "Russia's Presence in the Middle East during the Putin Period (Reviving Russia's Influence in Soviet-Influenced Countries". *Central Eurasian Studies*, Vol 8, No 1, 42-68. (In persian)

22. Massoudnia, Hussein, et al. (2012). "Leaving the Syrian Crisis from Mediation to Supporting Opposition to the Government". *Motaleate Siasie Jahane Eslam*, No. 4, (5), 102-138. (In persian)

23. Misto, Mohamad, Temizer, Selen (2019). "Russia establishes new Military Bases in Northern Syria". AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/russia-establishes-new-military-bases-in-northern-syria/1661570

24. Mohseni, Payam, (2015). "Introduction: The Russian Intervention in Syria". In The Iran Project disrupting the chessboard perspectives on the Russian Intervention Syria". *Harvard Kennedy School Belfercenter for science and international Affairs*, Octobr (2015)

25. North, Robert C., Koch, Howard E JR, Zinnes, Dina A. (1960). "The Integrative Functions of Conflict", *Conflict Resolution*, Vol, IV, No, 3, 320-384.

26. North, Robert, C. (1975). "Decision- Making in Crisis an Introduction". *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, VOL, 6, NO, 2, 12-48.

27. Peyrouse, Sebastien, Boonstr, Jos, and Laruelle, Marlene (2012). "Security and Development Approaches to Central Asia: the Eu Compared to China and Russia". *Eu Cam Working Paper*, No, 11. 3-122

28. Phillips, Christopher (2012). "Into the Quagmire: Turkey's Frustrated Syria Policy". *The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London*, 1-112.

29. Schelling, Thomasc (1966). Arms and Influence. *New Haven and London yale University Press,* 10-428

30. Shaykh al-Islami, Mohammad Hassan; Begi, Meysam (2013). "Analysis of the Role of Creation and the Policies of the Russian Federation in the Face of the Syrian Crisis". *Faslnameh Afaq Amniyat*, 6 (20), 150-186. (In persian)

31. Shumilin, Alexander (2016). "Russia's Diplomacy in the Middle East: Back to Geopolitics". *Russia. Nei. Visions*, No, 93. 50- 94.

32. Simbar, Reza, Sotoudeh, Ali Asghar, Esmaili, Ali (2016). "Russia's Strategy in the Syrian Crisis, (2001-2014)". *Motaleate Orasiae Marcazi*, Vol 9, No 2. 300-364. (in persian)

33. Sladden, James, Wasser, Becca, Connable, Ben, Grand, Clement, Sarah (2017). "Russian Strategy in the Middle East". *Rand Corporation*, NO.4.

34. Tarmi, Kamran (2002). "Iran-Russia Cooperation and US Policies towards Iran". *Majles va Pajohesh*, 9(35). 50-93. (in persian)

35. Trenin, Dimitri (2017). "Puttin's Plan for Syria: How Russia Wants to End the War". Foreign Affairs. No. 9. 10-48.

36. Trenin, Dmitri (2013). "*The Mythical Alliance: Russia's Syria Policy"*. *Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.* 1-168.

37. Vaezi, Mahmoud (2010). "New International System and International Crisis Management". *Rahbord*, No. 59. (In persian)

 38. Wakim, Jamal (2015). "Russian Troops in Syria: Ensuring Access to the East Mediterranean". In the Iran Project in Iran Project Disrupting the Chess Board: Perspectives on the Russian Intervention in Syria, *Belfer center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School*, No19. 20-67.

39. Wilkenfeld, jonathan (1991). "Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crisis". *Journal of conflict resolution*, Vol; 3, No, 1.130-185.

40. Zinnes. Dina (1966). "Why War". *Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol*; 5, No, 2. 140-179.