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Analyzing the Russian 's interventionist policy in the Syrian crisis | ||
| مطالعات سیاسی جهان اسلام | ||
| دوره 9، شماره 4 - شماره پیاپی 36، دی 1399، صفحه 1-18 اصل مقاله (618.58 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.30479/psiw.2020.12350.2698 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| حسین دهشیری1؛ مهدیه حیدری* 2 | ||
| 1استاد گروه علوم سیاسی دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران | ||
| 2دکتری راوبط بین الملل، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 08 دی 1398، تاریخ بازنگری: 30 تیر 1399، تاریخ پذیرش: 21 آبان 1399 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| Purpose: The main purpose of this article is to understand theinterventionist policy of Russia in the Syrian crisis Method: is an explanatory – description method and from the perspective of the Stanford School. So, the main question is “why did Russia use interventionist policy and violent behavior in the Syrian crisis?” The temporary hypothesis is that Russia, based on its threat perception to its important values, used the interventionist policy in the Syrian crisis. So, Russia's core values, based on the Stanford School, including: supporting of its strategic allay such as Iran, fighting with terrorist and take away from its back – yard and rising its bargaining power in the international system, these values deal with the actor's position and quality of life in the international system. Therefore, they fall into the category of important or secondary values than vital values. Result: by applying the Stanford School Model, this result has been concluded that there was a positive correlation between the Russian’s perception threat (stimulus) and its interventionist and violent behavior (response) in the Syrian crisis. Findings: At least, findings of this article declared that Russian decision maker, by proper perception concerns and fears of environmental threats, could make balance of power in front of USA and its allies in negotiations table and in ground operations, freezed successfully the Islamic extremist in Syria and supported Iranian forces and their plans just due to its benefit and its interest both during the war and during the post war. In this article, the Russian threat perception is an independent variable of research, and use of interventionist behavior is the dependent variable of this research. Data collection and information methods are also based on library and Internet methods. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| Threat Perception؛ Russia؛ Syria؛ Stanford School؛ Response -Stimulus؛ Crisis Management | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Analyzing the Russian 's interventionist policy in the Syrian crisis | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Hossein Daheshiar1؛ Mahdieh Heydari2 | ||
| 1Prof. of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 2Ph.D. International Relations, Allameh Tabatabai University | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Purpose: The main purpose of this article is to understand theinterventionist policy of Russia in the Syrian crisis Method: is an explanatory – description method and from the perspective of the Stanford School. So, the main question is “why did Russia use interventionist policy and violent behavior in the Syrian crisis?” The temporary hypothesis is that Russia, based on its threat perception to its important values, used the interventionist policy in the Syrian crisis. So, Russia's core values, based on the Stanford School, including: supporting of its strategic allay such as Iran, fighting with terrorist and take away from its back – yard and rising its bargaining power in the international system, these values deal with the actor's position and quality of life in the international system. Therefore, they fall into the category of important or secondary values than vital values. Result: by applying the Stanford School Model, this result has been concluded that there was a positive correlation between the Russian’s perception threat (stimulus) and its interventionist and violent behavior (response) in the Syrian crisis. Findings: At least, findings of this article declared that Russian decision maker, by proper perception concerns and fears of environmental threats, could make balance of power in front of USA and its allies in negotiations table and in ground operations, freezed successfully the Islamic extremist in Syria and supported Iranian forces and their plans just due to its benefit and its interest both during the war and during the post war. In this article, the Russian threat perception is an independent variable of research, and use of interventionist behavior is the dependent variable of this research. Data collection and information methods are also based on library and Internet methods. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Threat Perception, Russia, Syria, Stanford School, Response -Stimulus, Crisis Management | ||
| مراجع | ||
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